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“NO BAD STORIES”
The American Media-Military Relationship
Douglas Porch
The 1999 air war over Kosovo re-ignited a feud between the military and thenews media that is generally believed to have been a permanent undercur-
rent of media-military relations since the Vietnam War. The events of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 and the subsequent declaration by President George W. Bush of a
“War on Terrorism” temporarily drove the feud un-
derground. But soon the media began, albeit tenta-
tively, to second-guess Pentagon strategy in
Afghanistan. Indeed, the general consensus among
military people, the press, and academics is that a co-
operative working relationship between the press and
the military that had been established in World War II
collapsed in the 1960s. While these groups disagree
significantly on whether media criticism of U.S. pol-
icy and strategy contributed to America’s defeat in
Southeast Asia, the view that Vietnam was a turning
point in media-military relations is widespread. “The
War in Southeast Asia changed the fundamental con-
tours of military-media relations,” write a sociologist
and a Pentagon reporter. “As in World War II, a group
of young correspondents—David Halberstam, Neil
Sheehan, Malcome Browne, Peter Arnett and Charley
Mohr—who arrived in Vietnam in the early 1960s, be-
came famous for their reporting. Unlike World War II,
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however, these reporters incurred the wrath of the official establishment for
their contrary accounts of the war’s progress.”1 Paradoxically, according to this
view, media-military relations may have been better when censorship was in
force, as in World War II.2
This article will argue, however, that the strained relationship between the
media and the U.S. military has nothing to do with censorship—for the simple
reason that media-military relations have always been rocky, never more than in
World War II. The difference between World War II and Vietnam was not the
presence of censorship but the absence of victory. In other conflicts, victory has
erased memories of a troubled relationship; after Vietnam, the media was
caught up in the quest for a scapegoat. Furthermore, the nebulous goals of the
War on Terrorism, the fact that it is likely to be a prolonged operation, and the
inherent difficulties from a media perspective of covering a war fought from the
air and in the shadows virtually guarantee a degeneration of the relationship be-
tween two institutions with an inherent distrust of each other.
How then do we account for chronically poor media-military relations in
America? The basic explanation is that the natures and goals of the two institu-
tions are fundamentally in tension. For its part, the military, like most bureau-
cracies, prefers to do its business behind closed doors—all the more so because
the nature of its business is so often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on
whose support it must rely. Therefore, the military inherently sees the media as a
subversive, rather than a positive, element. The press, however, responds to the
requirement of democracy to expose the actions of the government—including,
especially, the military—to public scrutiny. Moreover, in recent years, the ten-
dency to formulate U.S. foreign policy with little or no formal debate between
the administration and the Congress has left a vacuum that the media has
rushed to fill. Even were that not the case, however, the press has a responsibility
to question the matching of policy to strategy.
Theoretically, this interaction is mutually beneficial, for it could allow the two
institutions to work symbiotically to build support for policy and to tell the mili-
tary’s story. Nevertheless, there is a shadow over media-military relations, which
the legacy of the Vietnam War has darkened.
Finally, future trends are likely to make media-military relations more, rather
than less, difficult. An increase in humanitarian operations, the reliance on air
campaigns and stand-off weapons, the difficulties of covering a “terrorist war,”
the emergence of “information operations,” and changes in the media environ-
ment pose severe challenges. Nevertheless, the two institutions must recognize
that it is in the interests of both to make the relationship work.
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FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO VIETNAM
Poor media-military relations are in reality symptomatic of a deeper issue for
civil-military relations in the United States. One of the sources of misunder-
standings between the media and the military is the widely held perception
among conservatives, both inside and outside the military, that the press was
largely responsible for America’s defeat in the Vietnam War. This “subver-
sion” is held to have been a new departure in media-military relations, perpe-
trated by a new generation of skeptical “liberal” reporters, different from
their predecessors.
In fact, however, the relationship between the media and the military did not
suddenly collapse during the Vietnam War. Animosity between the two is as old
as the foundations of the Republic itself. During the Revolution, George Wash-
ington complained that loyalist newspapers undermined patriotic morale, while
patriotic ones lacked the most elementary notions of military secrecy. Soon af-
terward, officers sent by President John Adams to impose taxes on Pennsylvania
farmers publicly flogged newspaper editors who criticized their actions. In 1814,
during the New Orleans campaign, Andrew Jackson jailed and attempted to
court-martial a local editor who had dared to publish an article without submit-
ting it for censorship. The Mexican War of 1846 was the first in which papers
competed to publish stories sent back by the newly invented telegraph and the
Pony Express. This produced a nineteenth-century “CNN effect”; political
leaders as well as the general public learned of developments from press stories
that arrived before the official reports. The Associated Press was founded in
1848 to pool reporting resources, disseminate correspondence from soldiers at
the front, and communicate the government’s war goals to the public. Also in
that war, the military published “camp newspapers,” an early public-affairs at-
tempt to keep up troop morale. The civilian press used them as sources “from
the seat of the war.”
During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln realized early on that newspapers
would be a key component in sustaining support in a deeply split North. In April
1861 the government took control of telegraph lines leading to Washington and
in August threatened court-martial should any of the five hundred Northern
journalists covering the war breach security. The noncombatant status of the
150 or so correspondents who reported from the front was seldom respected.
General William T. Sherman, a firm believer in press censorship, blamed the Un-
ion defeat in the first battle of Bull Run on the publication of orders of battle in
Washington and New York newspapers. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
seized newspapers that were too liberal with military information, while manip-
ulating others into publishing false reports. This did not prevent “Copperhead”
papers in the North from vehemently attacking Lincoln and the war.
P O R C H 8 7
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Neither is press-driven policy a recent phenomenon. The “yellow journalism”
promoted by rivals William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer is often
blamed for provoking the popular agitation that led to the Spanish-American
War of 1898. Major General Nelson A. Miles replicated Stanton’s manipulation
of the press, deliberately misleading reporters about the location of his intended
landing in Puerto Rico. The Espionage Act, which accompanied America’s entry
into World War I, followed by the
Sedition Act of 1918, severely re-
stricted the ability of the press to
publish information on military
operations or war production, let
alone disparage the uniform and
the flag. Woodrow Wilson estab-
lished a Committee on Public Information that both regulated censorship and
produced propaganda for the American cause. Credentialed war correspon-
dents, sworn to tell the truth, reported from military camps well behind the lines
in France. General John Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary
Force, accredited only thirty-one reporters and forbade even these to travel to
the front lines.3 Fear of a “stab in the back” lurked behind these measures; cen-
sorship was justified by the need “to keep up the spirit of the armies and people
of our side.”4
WORLD WAR II AND KOREA
World War II is often viewed as the golden age of media-military relations—a
time when the country stood fully behind the war effort and the press reflected
the patriotic mood. Civilian reporters were treated as part of “America’s team,”
willingly acquiescing to “press codes” as a condition of accreditation by the War
Department. The identities and movements of forces and materiel, production
figures, casualties, and locations of archives and art treasures were forbidden to
reporters; even weather forecasts and temperatures in major cities were cen-
sored. But the press accepted censorship with barely a murmur, and the reward
for compliance was substantial—relatively free access to combat theaters.
Wearing the uniforms of officers, journalists joined press camps attached to
and moving with combat forces. Print journalists, more or less “embedded” in
units, wrote, often poignantly, of the horrors of battle and the suffering of the
GIs. Twenty-seven reporters accompanied the D-day assault in Normandy. The
precursor of the modern “press pool” emerged among radio correspondents,
serving as a “neutral voice” representative of all correspondents. Some service-
men who had been journalists before the war were made “combat correspon-
dents” after basic training; their stories and photographs were released, after
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censorship, by the various service departments. Overall, the Office of War Infor-
mation and the Office of Censorship exercised their control through persuasion,
though the Espionage Act always lurked menacingly in the background.
Both pools and “embedded reporters” foreshadowed recent practice; many
broader patterns now thought of as contemporary also emerged in World War
II. In the first place, the press sometimes shaped policy and influenced strategy.
For instance, descriptions of valiant Britain beneath the German “blitz” in the
summer of 1940 helped to firm up the destroyers-for-bases arrangement and
ultimately Lend-Lease. “Press and radio commentators were uniformly hostile,
some passionately so,” to the agreement General Mark Clark struck in Novem-
ber 1942 with Vichy admiral Jean Darlan to halt the fighting between Vichy
French and Allied troops in
North Africa. “I have been called
a Fascist and almost a Hitlerite,”
General Dwight Eisenhower,
Clark’s superior, complained.5
Press criticism of the Darlan deal
propelled the “unconditional
surrender” policy adopted by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.
Newsweek continually pointed up the disparity between American goals in Eu-
rope and the resources available, as well as differences among the Allies over the
future of Europe, reviving the arguments of congressional isolationists.6
The press also, as now, heavily influenced the fortunes of prominent com-
manders; even the most popular generals could be second-guessed. Drew Pearson
was prepared to deflate the most exalted reputations in his syndicated column,
“Washington Merry-go-Round.” In the opinion of Eisenhower’s son John, the
press came perilously close to ending Ike’s career.7 His decision in September
1943 to maintain Marshal Pietro Badoglio, one of Mussolini’s ex-henchmen,
and King Victor Emanuel in power in Italy was denounced by the New York
Times as the continuation of military dictatorship supported by a puppet king.8
After the Normandy breakout in August 1944, Newsweek allowed retired British
general J. F. C. Fuller to criticize Ike for violating the principle of “concentration
of force.” Even in making Eisenhower its “Man of the Year” in December 1944,
Time cautioned that Hitler’s Ardennes offensive cast doubt on the Supreme
Allied Commander’s strategic judgement.9
It is often forgotten that some officers who received favorable press coverage
assiduously cultivated reporters. “Without preaching or complaining, [Eisen-
hower] told [correspondents] frankly about what was going wrong, and made it
possible for them to see the problems with their own eyes. He then counted on
them to make the country aware of what was needed.”10 One correspondent who
P O R C H 8 9
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had expected to find Eisenhower “jumping all over the place issuing orders right
and left” instead discovered a man “more like a big industrial executive who, on
the day the plant is breaking production records, will show visitors around the
mill as if he had nothing else to do.”11 In contrast, commanders whom reporters
thought inadequately prepared were particular targets. The press, for instance,
alerted the American public to shortcomings revealed by the Louisiana Maneu-
vers of August–September 1941.
Further, “investigative journalists” sought out opportunities to roast aloof or
abusive commanders, like George S. Patton—who slapped and cursed soldiers
hospitalized for shell shock. A “gentlemen’s agreement” initially suppressed that
incident, but in an egregious departure from journalistic ethics, war correspon-
dents demanded that Eisenhower remove Patton, under threat of going public.
When Eisenhower tried to compromise, Drew Pearson broke the story on his
syndicated radio show. The subsequent public tempest was so violent that Secre-
tary of War Henry L. Stimson had to justify to the Senate Eisenhower’s decision
not to court-martial Patton. That incident, and others like it, demonstrated the
high price political leaders had to pay to defend generals who offended norms of
democratic behavior.12
In the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur was notorious for pressuring report-
ers to file stories that reflected positively on him. However, he could not control
reporters not accredited to his command. In January 1944, the American Mer-
cury suggested that MacArthur’s heroic image was a Republican-manufactured
myth to use against Roosevelt. The Army War College library distributed the ar-
ticle to American servicemen all over the world; Republicans in the Senate
blasted the War Department for carrying out a “smear.” A blistered War Depart-
ment subsequently prevented Harper’s Magazine from publishing a second un-
flattering article; its editor objected, “This situation is intolerable in a free
country.” In the summer of 1944 the press publicized the fact that MacArthur
was the only senior general allowed to have his wife in theater. It also reported,
unfairly, that he made his headquarters in luxurious colonial mansions while his
troops battled malaria.13
The surprise attack that opened the Korean War in 1950 found the military
completely unprepared to handle the reporters who arrived to cover the panic
and confusion of the war’s early days. This inevitably provoked criticism that an
uncensored press was giving information of use to the enemy and undermining
the morale of United Nations forces. Local commanders responded with their
own rules; ultimately the Overseas Press Club petitioned the Pentagon to replace
this patchwork of “voluntary guidelines” with formal, standard ones. MacAr-
thur (now supreme commander of UN forces in Korea) imposed formal censor-
ship, forbidding reporters to criticize, among other things, military reverses,
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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failures of U.S. equipment, or the South Korean government;14 true to form,
MacArthur also banned all articles critical of his leadership.15 His successor,
Matthew Ridgway, virtually barred the press from the armistice talks.
The Vietnam War and Its Legacies
Vietnam has been called the “first TV war,” a test of the American public’s toler-
ance for battle brought into its living rooms. Journalists were allowed practically
unrestricted access, accompanying units and freely filing stories, photographs,
and film. The idea that reporters opposed to the war used this freedom to pub-
lish negative stories that contributed significantly to the final defeat quickly be-
came standard; it was espoused by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard
Nixon, as well as by the U.S. commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, General
William Westmoreland.
This explanation, however, has been discredited by numerous studies.16 In
fact, press coverage was generally favorable until the Tet offensive of 1968. As
later became clear, that dramatic campaign was a military disaster for the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong; nonetheless, it blasted the credibility of claims by the
White House and Westmoreland that the United States and South Vietnam were
on the threshold of victory. The critical tone adopted by the press thereafter
“confirm[ed] the widespread public view held well before Tet, that the people
had been victims of a massive deception” and that the prospects for success were
in fact doubtful.17 Arguably, then, the press did not create public skepticism but
simply reflected public concern about casualties and the lack of tangible prog-
ress. Certainly, neither the White House nor the military was honest with the
press. Official briefings in Saigon—dismissed by the press as the “Five o’Clock
Follies”—were remarkably uninformative, when not deceptive. On the other
hand, coverage of the increasingly violent antiwar protests shored up support
for the war, because it showed the peace movement in an unflattering light.
One cannot blame the press for asking searching questions about a poor pol-
icystrategy match. That is its duty. Nevertheless, the impact of the Vietnam War
on U.S. media-military relations has been profound. The press today regards the
practically unrestricted access and uncensored reporting that it enjoyed in Viet-
nam as the norm, not a historical anomaly. The more superficial, or arrogant, of
its members further believe that Vietnam confirmed and validated the power of
the press to influence public opinion and, by extension, policy.
The military, for its part, saw proof of its long-standing suspicion that the
press is an adversary and must be kept at arm’s length during conflicts.18 The
Army in particular feels that a new, and distinctly destructive, press was born in
Vietnam—skeptical of authority, liberal in political outlook, and invariably
hostile to military values and missions. The mistake of Vietnam, many military
P O R C H 9 1
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people feel, was to give the media free rein, license that they used to subvert pop-
ular support. A piece of “military wisdom” emerged from Vietnam: “Real men
don’t talk to the press.”19
THE ROOTS OF POOR MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS
If the poor media-military relations of today are not wholly a product of the
Vietnam War but have existed throughout the nation’s history, how does one
account for them? First, the institutional cultures of the two communities are
virtually antithetical. Whether or not the media have a liberal bias, it is certainly
true that journalists see it as their role to expose abuses of power by large institu-
tions, and in the military arena to publicize instances where democratic and mil-
itary values clash. As a practical matter, however, the press is fragmented into
many competing and self-regulating subgroups; there are no broad professional
standards. “The great strength of American journalism is its amateur nature,”
insists one correspondent. “Anyone can become a reporter. This guarantees
many different perspectives.”20 It also guarantees that journalists have a great
deal of competition; each must not only collect information but package it in a
form that will sell to the general public—and therefore be blessed by edi-
tors—before other journalists do. Reporters are therefore under great pressure
to bend, even break, rules in pursuit of a “story”—and a by-line.
If the world of the journalist is freewheeling and entrepreneurial, the task of
managing violence imposes on the soldier an organization and attitude that is
hierarchical and disciplined. The soldier is a “team player” in an institution with
strict professional and ethical standards as well as rigorous, even ritualized, pro-
cedures. “The natural tendency of the military [is] to keep things under control,”
an Army public affairs officer observes.21 The military man or woman particu-
larly values loyalty and is deeply suspicious of, even offended by, the “publish
and be damned” journalistic ethos. Further, if recruitment, outlook, and tech-
nology make the “Fourth Estate” a heterogeneous institution—if it is an “insti-
tution” at all—a number of factors, especially the fact that soldiers, sailors,
Marines, and airmen live apart from civilian society, tend to impose insularity
upon them and to homogenize their attitudes. The political outlook of military
people tends to be conservative.22
Second, the goals of the two institutions are different. The journalist seeks to
tell a story of such interest that the public will pay for it; every member of the
military, however, is to pursue national objectives by fulfilling specific missions
assigned by political leaders. Moreover, the mechanism by which the military
performs its role is war, or the threat of war—and war is an awful thing, a job the
military is understandably reluctant to perform in public. Military people typi-
cally believe that reporters, untutored in the fundamentals of the military
9 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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profession, are psychologically unprepared to deal with the realities of combat.
They fear that reporters, in quests for sensationalism rather than truth, may
publish stories or images that breach security, cost lives, or undermine public
support. For their part, reporters insist upon their professional obligation and
constitutional duty to report the news. They consider the military’s culture
closed, its insistence on operational secrecy exaggerated, and its “command cli-
mate” a barrier to outside scrutiny.
These two dichotomies are in themselves the raw material for deterioration of
the media-military relationship, but a third factor, some journalists argue, ag-
gravates it—the increasingly haphazard way U.S. foreign policy is formulated.
All concerned recognize, at least in theory, that media scrutiny is an aspect of a
healthy civilian control of the military and also an exercise of free speech—both
cornerstones of the Constitution, which military people are sworn to uphold. In
that light, media activism becomes especially necessary when military opera-
tions are undertaken after only minimal public debate among elected officials.
Many journalists argue that Washington seems to assume a public grant of “vir-
tual consent” for the employment of military force whenever the president
chooses, what one reporter calls a “fire-and-forget foreign policy.”23 They hold
that the media have a charge to step into this policy vacuum, to supply the infor-
mation and provide the deliberation that officials and politicians withhold and
shirk—and even to shape policy. In retrospect, it seems hardly surprising that
good will crumbled (as we will see) during the Kosovo conflict and appeared to
be on shaky ground during the early stages of the assault on Afghanistan. The
real question is why such deterioration was a surprise at the time; it had been
foreshadowed in every American military involvement since Vietnam, especially
in the Persian Gulf.
ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A WORKING RELATIONSHIP
Warfare is a political act. Political leaders, in democracies at least, must inform
the public about foreign policy goals; the military must convince the public that
it can achieve those goals at an acceptable cost; and both must do so largely
through the press. Press reports of success and progress strengthen and extend
public support. The media also familiarize the public with the military and
with the complexity of its tasks. In short, the media offers the military a means
to tell its story. The press, as we have seen, has its own incentives to report on
military affairs, and it needs the military’s cooperation to do so effectively.
Therefore, both the media and the military have reasons to work with the other
in a symbiotic relationship.
For the military’s part, the necessary first step is to recognize that the press is a
fact of life, a feature of the battlefield environment—“kind of like the rain,” as
P O R C H 9 3
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one Marine put it. “If it rains, you operate wet.”24 Unfortunately, past attempts to
establish effective, let alone harmonious, arrangements have foundered on hos-
tility and distrust bordering sometimes on paranoia.
Press Pools
In the 1980s, the media and the Pentagon agreed on ground rules for coopera-
tion. Each major command was issued public-affairs guidance acknowledging
the right of the public and Congress to “timely and accurate information” about
military operations, to the extent compatible with security. It set out precise
rules on the accreditation of reporters, standards for stories, security reviews,
and the support of media in combat zones.
The plans were first tested in URGENT FURY, the 1983 operation that rescued
U.S. medical students on the island of Grenada. Two serious flaws quickly
emerged. First, rather than integrating media affairs in its planning, the com-
mand simply handed off the press to a specialized corps of public affairs officers.
Because these officers were themselves kept in the dark, they were unable to sat-
isfy the press’s curiosity about military goals, preparations, and progress. The
second problem grew from the first—the military was logistically unresponsive
to press needs, largely because the media had not been factored into operational
planning. As a consequence, over six hundred disgruntled reporters were ma-
rooned in comfortable exile on Barbados while the story played out, unseen and
hence unreported, on Grenada.25
The resulting media outcry prodded the military to review its practices.26 A
commission was convened under Major General Winant Sidle, U.S. Army, to
reconcile press access with operational security. The Sidle Commission’s major
accomplishment was the Department of Defense National Media Pool, created
in 1985. Journalists nominated by the major news organizations and agreeing in
advance to abide by security regulations and to share reports with nonpool re-
porters would be ready to move to the “seat of war” at a moment’s notice. The
Media Pool would operate as a group only until the “main body” of reporters ap-
peared. Practice deployments in Central America suggested that the pool was lo-
gistically manageable, would produce a core of reporters versed in military
affairs, and would ensure prompt coverage of events.
The pool was first mobilized operationally during EARNEST WILL, the
reflagging of Kuwaiti merchant ships in 1987–88; it encountered problems that
would become acute in subsequent deployments. The next opportunity came in
December 1989, when U.S. troops were ordered into Panama. Unfortunately,
that experience showed that old attitudes had not yet died. The secretary of de-
fense, Richard Cheney—who held the media responsible for undermining
public morale in Vietnam and “did not look on the press as an asset”—delayed
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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calling out the pool.27 The result was that nonpool reporters simply traveled to
Panama on their own, to practice “four-wheel-drive journalism”; when the press
pool was finally mobilized, its members, all specially prepared for the job, were
fobbed off with briefings and not allowed to cover the action.28
If Panama did little to foster trust between the media and the military, the war
in the Persian Gulf lifted matters to a new plateau of acrimony. At the outset of
DESERT SHIELD, things looked generally promising. Cheney quickly activated
the seventeen-member Media Pool—only to learn that King Fahd of Saudi Ara-
bia refused to grant visas to reporters. Some journalists simply flew to Bahrain
and crossed the border into Saudi Arabia illegally—the “unilaterals,” prowling
on the margins of the conflict, in
constant fear of expulsion by the
U.S. military or the Saudi police.29
When CNN began to broadcast
from Baghdad, however, Fahd was
persuaded to lift his ban. The pool
got its initial briefing five days after the first U.S. troops deployed in Saudi Ara-
bia in early August. It remained in existence for three weeks, even as the forces in
Saudi Arabia were being swamped by 1,600 other reporters. In response to this
massive media interest in the first large-scale military deployment since Viet-
nam, the military organized new, ad hoc press pools; accredited reporters who
agreed to abide by security regulations would be escorted in small groups to visit
military positions and be briefed by unit commanders. “Noncompetitive”
ground rules made photographs, notes, and stories available to reporters not in
the pools; the military would transmit the stories back to parent news organiza-
tions, using a communications facility in Dhahran.
Despite appearances of success, however, the pool system as practiced in the
Gulf War had several problems. The primary issue was what seemed to journal-
ists to amount to censorship and manipulation, arising from tight restrictions
on all media travel. Press veterans of Vietnam were rapidly disabused of the no-
tion that they would be free to flit about the war zone, then return to Dhahran to
file stories. In fact, most reporters never saw the war; only 186 reporters ever
joined the news pools, less than 10 percent of the journalists enrolled by the
Central Command’s Joint Information Bureau.
Also, journalists rapidly concluded that logistical support for the pools was
low in the military’s priorities, and that this was intentional. Requests to visit
units were frequently rejected because of lack of transport (when not declined
for security concerns). The system was cumbersome and unresponsive to break-
ing news. The military did not file pool products expeditiously. The media tours
were “too canned.” Ultimately, chafing under restrictions, journalists charged
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that delays and press-shy officers reflected a command mandate that there were
to be “no bad stories.”30 Worse, from the press viewpoint, “When the war hap-
pened, we couldn’t see it.”31 Veteran reporter Walter Cronkite later insisted that
“the Pentagon’s censorship policy”
in the Persian Gulf “severely re-
stricted the right of reporters and
photographers to accompany our
troops into action, as had been
permitted in all our previous wars.”32 Two Australian scholars concluded that
“the campaign to liberate Kuwait was perhaps the most underreported and
media-managed conflict in history.”33
The U.S. Marines—who perhaps realize more than the other services the
value of the press—welcomed journalists, but ironically, even this openness
backfired. The media later claimed that it had been unwittingly co-opted into an
elaborate deception designed to draw attention to the Marine amphibious force
off the coast—a force that the joint commander in chief, General Norman
Schwarzkopf, did not intend to employ—so as to distract the Iraqis from the
true objectives. The press charged that General Schwarzkopf had deceived it in
other ways as well. One was the false impression given that precision, laser-
guided ordnance dominated the air campaign. Another was exaggeration of the
success of Patriot missiles in intercepting Iraqi Scuds (although these claims had
been made in good faith). To such complaints the military simply replied that it
could not have allowed the media to reveal the coalition’s true plans—especially
not the “left hook” through the desert of southern Iraq into Kuwait.34
If it strained media-military relations, the pool system also—by its emphasis
on collective effort and shared products—divided the journalistic fraternity it-
self. Journalists are competitors by nature, not team players. “[Competition] is
their livelihood. They don’t like the other guy’s take on a story. [A public affairs
officer] cannot tell other reporters what each is working on. That’s death!”35 Un-
able to compete freely for stories, reporters in the Gulf and their employers
sought ways to circumvent the rules. The larger press organizations plotted to
exclude members of smaller or independent ones from pools or groups selected
for particular visits; certain “nontraditional” media in the field, like women’s
magazines, fought to be included. Reporters jostled to lobby public affairs offi-
cers or generals for priority. Such infighting, combined with arbitrary selection
procedures for pool trips, sometimes pushed aside reporters experienced in mil-
itary matters in favor of novices.36 A few journalists evaded pool restrictions by
becoming “pet journalists,” willing to report favorably on a general or unit in
return for access to the front.
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Ultimately, in the view of media cognoscenti, the Gulf War pool system pro-
duced a mediocre product. It seemed to these veteran reporters an undifferenti-
ated pap, distilled from the collective observations of the few journalists allowed
into the field, rather than the creative perceptions of individual reporters free to
fashion stories out of the raw drama they observed. They thought the journalis-
tic quality of pool stories “depressing. . . . [A]bout one in ten has anything in it
that’s useful. . . . It’s really pretty superficial stuff.”37
Pools, therefore, are not popular with the press, which sees them as attempts
to limit access and thereby censor, even manipulate, information. The immedi-
ate postwar result was the issuance of new guidelines declaring, “Open and inde-
pendent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military
operations.”38 The directive retains the option of censorship—a clause that the
media decided not to protest, believing that “security reviews” would soon be-
come unenforceable, for reasons discussed below.
Embedded Media
The advent of “operations other than war” and journalists’ objections to the
pool system revived the concept of “embedded media,” an approach first used in
World War II and Vietnam, applied in Haiti in 1994, and expanded for the
Bosnia intervention the next year. In this arrangement, a reporter is assigned a
unit, deploys with it, and lives with it throughout a lengthy period of operations.
All in uniform are considered spokespersons for the military and for their mis-
sions. However, interviewers must nevertheless respect soldiers’ privacy, as well
as operational security. Rules also prohibit reporting on intelligence collection,
special operations, or casualties.
“Embedding”reporters in units has much to offer both sides. These reporters,
who usually bond with their units, are likely to appreciate the difficulties of the
mission and tend to file favorable reports.39 On the other hand, the military can-
not hope to mask bad policy or hide incompetence from such journalists. In
general, living together breaks down media-military hostility, allows the press to
blend into the operational landscape, and in turn makes soldiers far less
self-conscious about the presence of reporters—whom they often respect for
sharing their dangers and hardships. The reporters get their stories, and the mil-
itary gets free and generally favorable publicity for a job it performs with great
credit. “I learn stuff every day with a unit,” a veteran correspondent observes.
“I’ve never been in a front line unit that didn’t enjoy having reporters. . . . [They
see it] as a sign that the American people are interested. The troops really love it.
I was called ‘our reporter.’”40
“Embedding” also attracts criticism, however. The media worry that report-
ers may identify too closely with “their” units and lose journalistic objectivity.
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For its part, the military dreads the off-the-record conversation or the minor or
poorly understood event that produces an unflattering story. Loose lips sink not
only ships but careers—and few officers who run afoul of the press today are
likely to receive the sustained high-level support needed to save General Patton.41
In Bosnia, reporter Tom Ricks once reported in print that an American battalion
commander had told African-American troops in his command, by way of
warning, that Croats are racists. The subsequent ruckus produced in the military
what is called the “Ricks Rule”—that all conversations with journalists are off
the record unless otherwise specified. Even that is considered weak protection
against reportorial bad faith: “Any [public affairs officer] will tell you that there
is no such thing as ‘off the record.’ There is no legal basis for it. There is only a
thin journalist ethic.”42 Ricks himself argues, however, that the “rule” betrays un-
willingness of seniors to support subordinates, and ultimately distrust of civil-
ian control of the military: “The amount of stuff I don’t publish is astounding.”43
KOSOVO AND THE FUTURE
The last decade has produced factors likely to make media-military relations
more difficult than ever to manage. They include the advent of humanitarian
operations, an increasing use by the United States of airpower and stand-off
weapons, the “war on terrorism,” and the emergence of “information opera-
tions.” Further, changing technological and institutional features of news cover-
age have outpaced formal attempts to order media-military relations. These
factors first began to manifest themselves in the Nato attempt in 1999 to expel
Yugoslav troops from the province of Kosovo.
Kosovo
Both the media and the U.S. military embarked upon Nato’s bombing campaign
with deep reservations. The media was profoundly skeptical of the undertaking,
an attitude that got its dealings with the military off on the wrong foot.44 Kosovo,
the first war that Nato nations had fought since DESERT STORM, was scripted in
the same way, less the ground invasion. Nato’s fundamental assumptions—that
airpower alone was sufficient, that President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia
would bend to the alliance’s will without a ground assault—had been debated
only in private, within alliance councils and the U.S. executive branch. In agree-
ment with broad sectors of expert and popular opinion, most correspondents
believed that these assumptions amounted to wishful thinking. Most news-
rooms sensed that the air strategy was simply the “lowest common denomina-
tor” available to an irresolute and deeply fractured alliance. Nor did Nato bolster
its credibility with the press when its miscalculation of Milosevic’s resolve became
clear. Far from capitulating in a matter of days, if not hours, Milosevic remained
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defiant and intensified his torment of Kosovo Albanians. In the view of many
journalists, neither the American nor the British peoples had an emotional in-
vestment in the conflict; both governments, the media concluded, would aban-
don the effort rather than undertake a ground invasion.45
Inevitably, then, the press was wary of information supplied by the military.
Press conferences evoked the media’s unhappy Gulf War memories of press
pools, denial of access, obfuscation, and apparent manipulation; the press re-
solved not to be fooled twice. Because reporters had scant access to Kosovo, it
could not see “ethnic cleansing.” Nor could it effectively cover the air war.46
Nato-supplied videos of precise
strikes made the strikes appear to
be extremely accurate—but so
had they appeared during the
Gulf War, when only a small per-
centage of the coalition air arse-
nals turned out to have been
precision guided munitions. The fact that Nato aircraft were ordered to fly
higher than fifteen thousand feet over Serbia and Kosovo seemed to confirm me-
dia pessimism over the ability of air strikes to prevent ethnic cleansing.47
Humanitarian Operations
On the surface, the advent of humanitarian operations has removed several
sources of tension in media-military relations. Censorship is seldom an issue;
operational security is not paramount, and the military is usually unable to
deny the press access to the theater even if it wished to. In fact, humanitarian
intervention has stood the traditional relationship between the American mili-
tary and the press on its head. Unlike wartime, national survival is not at stake;
the main effort is political, not military. The deployed force is only one of several
organizations involved, and its mission is merely to facilitate the work of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and civilian governmental organizations,
which have the primary tasks. “In the end, it is the NGOs’ war to win or lose.”48
Therefore, press pools, if deployed, are merely temporary expedients, quickly
abandoned. In fact, the media usually arrive before the military does; where in
wartime the military briefs reporters on the situation, in peace operations re-
porters are usually better informed than the soldiers.49
Still, the tensions inherent in media-military relations do not dissipate at a
stroke. On the contrary, they are complicated, particularly by the presence of
nongovernmental organizations. Military commanders often believe the media
have drawn them into operations that they view as dilutions of their true mission
of fighting wars. The root problem seems to be that humanitarian operations
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typically lack high-level direction;50 policy vacuums form, in which the media
are susceptible to the influence of NGOs—which “are increasingly involving
themselves directly in social, political, and even at times, military matters.”51
NGOs, the argument goes, depend for funding on publicity and accordingly
solicit the media to disseminate pictures of starving children and desperate refu-
gees, thereby generating pressure on the politicians, who in turn catapult sol-
diers into altruistic but poorly conceived missions.
Perhaps, as some correspondents believe, the isolation from the media of in-
tervention forces, in their protected compounds, puts them at a distinct disad-
vantage in any battle with NGOs to sway public perceptions. Others are not so
sure; because nongovernmental organizations are frequently international, they
lack drawing power for an American press corps focused on a national news
market. Additionally, the media often find it difficult to understand a contradic-
tor y NGO culture that combines hard business att i tudes with a
“flaky-do-gooder” image.52
The Somalia intervention of 1992–95 began as an object lesson in media-
military cooperation. The media were waiting on the beach when Navy SEALs
landed as part of a “signal” to the Somali militias about the power of U.S. forces.
However, relations soon went downhill. The media categorically refused there-
after to submit to military control. As the security situation deteriorated, the
media images of starving Somalis were blamed for the decision to intervene in
the first place, for contributing to “mission creep,” and finally, for undermining
popular support by focusing on casualties. For the military Somalia offered fur-
ther proof of the media’s power to inflict a “stab in the back,” as in Vietnam.53
The operation in Haiti in September 1994, however, saw a much more harmoni-
ous relationship. Ground rules were worked out in advance, and the press will-
ingly complied with most of the military’s operational security concerns. A Joint
Information Bureau, set up by the intervention force in Port-au-Prince, pro-
cessed requests from 1,300 journalists to visit units. No escort officers were re-
quested or supplied. The only hint that media might be driving policy occurred
when news reports caused the U.S. military to intervene to stop beatings of Aristide
supporters by paramilitary forces loyal to deposed President Raoul Cedras.
Air Campaigns and the Media
Whatever progress was made during the humanitarian operations of the 1990s
was disrupted, as we have seen, in Kosovo—in part because Nato chose to fight
that war with airpower alone. From a media standpoint, the air campaign meant
renewed dependence on the military for information. There are only three ways,
all unsatisfactory, to cover an air war. A reporter can “hitch a ride” on an aircraft;
this may give technical insights into how an air war is prosecuted, but a
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correspondent is unlikely to be able to gauge its effects from fifteen thousand feet
in the air. The second option is to sit through military briefings and look at videos
of precision strikes—that is, what the military wants the press to see. This leaves
the third option, which is for reporters to cross the lines to get the other side’s
version.
The press received a particular incentive to elicit Serb and Russian accounts
when Nato and Pentagon spokesmen and the Supreme Allied Commander
contradicted each other in their responses to the mistaken bombing of a convoy
of refugee tractors near Djakovica on 19 April 1999. Nato “couldn’t get its own
story straight.”54 Collateral damage, rather than ethnic cleansing and the refugee
crisis, threatened to become the central issue of the Kosovo conflict, undermin-
ing the moral credibility of, and hence public support for, the campaign. The
problem was compounded by the fact that Nato’s stand-off air campaign made
the alliance look like a ponderous Goliath assaulting a nimble David—a prob-
lem repeated in Afghanistan.55
Information Operations
Information operations, an outgrowth of “information warfare,” emerge from
the idea that instantaneous communications have revolutionized warfare. They
have certainly revolutionized press coverage—with the result, some argue, that
open media information is a more important dimension of information opera-
tions than familiar technical issues like “cyber attack.”56 Kosovo focused atten-
tion on the role in conflict of media images; the view emerged that the will of a
population to prosecute a conflict can be undermined by media-generated
images, and that therefore the media strategy must be an integral part of a cam-
paign plan. “Public information is a battle space,” it was argued, “that must be
contested and controlled like any other.”57
The room for improvement was obvious. A militarily weak Milosevic repeat-
edly forced the Nato allies onto the defensive by showcasing collateral damage
caused by bombing. Nato’s slow and sometimes inaccurate responses wounded
its credibility. Nato’s press offices were understaffed and lacked specialists able to
monitor Yugoslav media and anticipate propaganda ploys. Nato had no inte-
grated, forceful public-relations/information campaign. Separate briefings in
London, Washington, and Brussels often sent conflicting signals.
However, concentration on information operations is a potentially danger-
ous development in media-military—even civil-military—relations. It has led
enthusiasts to view information as a commodity to be manipulated for opera-
tional advantage, rather than as a shared trust. In any case, the concept is noth-
ing new in war; in 1870, for instance, Otto von Bismarck edited the “Ems dispatch”
to goad Louis Napoleon into declaring war on Prussia. A new element was the
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press’s willingness to go to the enemy for sources—as in Kosovo, and in Peter
Arnett’s famous broadcasts from Baghdad during the Gulf War—opening a
channel for the enemy’s own information operations. Osama Bin Laden,
and even the media-shy Taliban regime, discovered Al-Jazeera and the small,
Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic News Agency to be useful vehicles for dissemi-
nating their messages in the Muslim world, messages that invariably found
echoes in the Western news media. The perceived need to do so stems in part
from the reluctance of the military to supply information, to impose
“gray-outs” that leave the press hungry for material and instigate charges of se-
crecy and manipulation.
Some even in the defense community argue that to treat information as a
“battle space” has “dreadful implications,” that mixing public affairs with infor-
mation operations could do great harm.58 BBC news set the “gold standard” for
millions during World War II precisely in that, unlike its Axis competitors, it
vowed to broadcast the bad news as well as the good. By manipulating media
images for operational advantage, the military courts skepticism and hostility.
The 1999 bombing of Serb television facilities suggests that in future conflicts
journalists may be regarded as military targets. Foreign governments may re-
taliate against Western reporters, closing off an important information channel.
In the end, the public may become inoculated against government pronounce-
ments of success, as during the Vietnam War, and withdraw its support.
Finally, to treat information as “battle space” confuses operational success
with strategic victory. If goals are clear, popular, and achievable at reasonable
cost, no amount of media manipulation by either side will decide the issue. U.S.
public support for the Kosovo war remained unshaken despite pictures of collat-
eral damage, despite even the Chinese embassy bombing. The effectiveness of
Serbian media ploys—such as posting its stories on the World Wide Web, in
English—should not be exaggerated. 59
Changes in the Media Environment
Two trends in the media world—one technological, the other market related—seem
to offer contradictory indications about the future of media-military interac-
tion. Technological advances are likely to make information increasingly avail-
able to the press and independent of military control. Market trends, however,
suggest that the media’s dependence on the military for sellable material will
increase.
In future operations in which security risks are high, the military will no
doubt insist on control of information; however, “security at the source” (that is,
at the level of the individual service member) will necessarily become the rule,
because media infrastructures like “joint information bureaus” are already
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becoming irrelevant. Journalists can file directly from the field, anywhere on the
globe, using cell phones, the Internet, and remote-area network data systems
transmitting compressed video signals. Satellite, microwave, and fiber-optics
systems are becoming miniaturized and increasingly mobile. Reporters have ac-
cess to commercial satellite images that can reveal such things as troop deploy-
ments—making refusals for reasons of security to guide press pools to deployed
units less credible and effective.60 In fact, the security issue may soon be reversed:
an enemy missile could home on a reporter’s signal. Commanders in the future
may have to ask reporters willing to take that risk to move several hundred yards
away from their positions first.
The advances in technology, of course, cut both ways. Satellite imagery can be
easily modified. Video images are for the moment more difficult to alter, but that
will change. Manufactured videos and misleading stories can be posted on the
Internet. The media itself should be the first line of defense, filtering this infor-
mation to determine its credibility. But if journalists suspect that they are being
censored, denied information, manipulated, or deceived by their own military,
they may be more inclined to give the other side’s version of events the benefit of
the doubt.
Notwithstanding the media’s new ability to collect and disseminate informa-
tion independently, it is unlikely to go entirely its own way. A balance will proba-
bly be struck, not least because the long-term market trends are poor for foreign
news coverage in general, and for military stories in particular. Today the media,
though multinational in organization, must increasingly focus on regional
niche markets. News is a business, and polls and focus groups inform editors
that the priorities of the public are local news first, foreign news last. CNN, for
instance, has begun regional production to feed “foreign” news to the markets
where it is not foreign. In the United States, the international news most likely to
be covered is that which produces the most dramatic footage or has an American
connection. To obtain such material, the U.S. media needs the military; in that
framework, the military itself is the story.
The media perceives that the American public suffers from “compassion fa-
tigue.” What sells a story is not the crisis but the fact that the military arrives to
do something about it. “Unless U.S. troops are involved, it is difficult to convince
an editor that a story is worthwhile.”61 In any case, there is strong marketing
pressure on the media to conform to audience expectations; it is not in the inter-
est even of an international news organization like CNN to show footage, or give
its reporting a slant, that will offend the sensibilities of the American public.
In fact, the criticism of the allegedly “liberal” American media after 11 Septem-
ber 2001 was that they became cheerleaders for the War on Terrorism, “a
knee-jerk pandering to the public,” according to Australian journalist Carwyn
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James, “reflecting a mood of patriotism rather than informing viewers of the
complex, sometimes harsh realities they need to know.” For his part, CNN presi-
dent Walter Isaacson confessed, “If you get on the wrong side of public opinion,
you are going to get in trouble.”62This creates a great initial advantage for the
military—if, that is, it embraces the media rather than shuns them.63
Indeed, ignorance and misinformation are far more dangerous for the military
than is informed reporting, however critical in tone. But the media need help
here. Because the press is fragmented, competitive, sometimes ignorant of mili-
tary realities, and constantly whiplashed between the demands of the market
and those of journalistic ethics, however defined, the quality of coverage of mili-
tary events is inevitably uneven at best. Today, however, the situation is aggra-
vated by the fact that newsrooms are no longer “old-boys networks,” inclined to
accept some of the military’s more traditional ways as part of the journalistic
landscape. The tendency of unprepared reporters, charging from crisis to crisis,
unaware of the issues at stake or of how the military functions, is to frame com-
plex matters in simplistic ways—or even to indulge in “gotcha” journalism (fo-
cusing on errors and misstatements). For its part, the military owes access to
information both to Congress and the American people. Furthermore, it needs
to get its story out—for the military will be competing with other groups, and
enemies, eager to put their “spin” on events. To do this, it needs the media.
It will be impossible in the future to embargo news, as has sometimes been
done in the past. An artificial news vacuum would be filled by “on-line corre-
spondents,” nongovernmental organizations, and even the enemy. The media
gravitates toward the sources that are most obvious and available; tyrants and
terrorists like Saddam, Milosevic, and Bin Laden learned to welcome reporters.
Future enemies can be expected to develop sophisticated media strategies to
draw attention to, and assign external blame for, the suffering of their people;
the possibilities available to them for distortion, manipulation, and disinforma-
tion are growing.64 Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. military establish a
solid working relationship with the media, that it integrate them into its strat-
egy—and not keep reporters at arm’s length, as if they were hostile interlopers in
a private domain.
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